The Constitutional Court is composed of nine judges. The President of the Court is elected by the judges from among their ranks for a term of three years, with no possibility of re-election. Judges are elected by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia for a term of nine years, also without the possibility of re-election. Judges of the Constitutional Court are elected from the ranks of outstanding members of the legal profession.
The office of judge of the Constitutional Court is incompatible with the performance of other public office, profession or membership in a political party. Judges enjoy immunity akin to that of members of Parliament in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. Decisions regarding judicial immunity are made by the Court in proceedings stipulated by its procedural rules. Judges are exempt from obligations within the armed forces.
Ensuring the independence of the of the constitutional judiciary is a fundamental requirement in addressing matters related to its composition and the method of the election of the judges, and this is a necessary complement to the principle of independence of the constitutional judiciary from the principle of the organization of the authority. However, the composition of the Court, particularly through the selection of its judges, alongside its financing, represents an area where political decision-making bodies can exert significant influence on the constitutional-judicial role.
It is indisputable that the legislative body, through its role in electing the members of the Constitutional Court, indirectly impacts the performance of the role of this constitutional body. This potential influence is substantially limited by the Constitution, which stipulates that judges serve nine-year terms that do not coincide with the mandate of the legislative body, that the office of the judge position is incompatible with membership in a political party, and that the Constitutional Court alone determines when a judge’s term will cease under the conditions established by the Constitution.
According to the Constitution, two judges are proposed by the President of the Republic. The Judicial Council proposes two judges in the Constitutional Court from among the judges. According to the constitutional provision introduced by Amendment XV, the Assembly elects three judges by a majority vote of the total number of members of Parliament, whereby a majority vote of the total number of representatives belonging to communities that are not in the majority population of the Republic of Macedonia.
An essential complement to the foundations of the independence of the Constitutional Court, derived from the constitutional position and the method of judicial election, is the guarantee of material independence of the Court from bodies of the state authorities responsible for determining and executing the state budget. In this context, it is notable that material issues have an unfavorable effect on the full realization of the role of the Constitutional Court. The autonomous and independent position of the Court, as outlined in the Constitution, would be more comprehensive and practically achievable if it enjoyed greater financial autonomy. Currently, the funds required for the operations of the Court are allocated through the Budget of the Republic, without any major influence from the Court.
The Constitutional Court performs its competence during a session in full composition, and adopts decisions by a majority of votes from the total number.
Before formal deliberations in regular sessions, the Court may hold preparatory meetings and consultative discussions. The Court organizes public hearings when deemed necessary, except in cases concerning the protection of individual rights, where decisions are typically made based on public hearings. Regarding matters of internal organization and operation, the Court forms permanent and ad hoc committees.
The Court conducts its professional activities through the establishment of a dedicated administrative service.