On 24 March 2026, a roundtable on the topic “Introduction of a Constitutional Complaint?” was held at the Constitutional Court, with the support of the Delegation of the European Union in Skopje. As part of the event, Judge Tatjana Vasić-Bozadžieva LLM delivered an address, emphasising:
The introduction of a constitutional complaint depends on the creation of conditions for amending the Constitution. Unfortunately, this was once again highlighted as the main issue, which in a way diminishes optimism as to whether and when a constitutional complaint will be introduced.
Secondly, once constitutional amendments are adopted—through an appropriate constitutional provision—it will be necessary to regulate the relevant legal details. This brings us again to the need for a Law on the Constitutional Court and, consequently, further constitutional adjustments in that regard. As a result, this too becomes a distant objective, the realisation of which remains uncertain in the foreseeable future.
Thirdly, the Constitutional Court must undergo institutional growth.
Fourthly, efforts must be made to improve public awareness and education; and fifthly, a professional public debate must be initiated in order to secure expert input, alignment with the European Convention on Human Rights, consistency with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, and the functionality of the mechanism as an effective legal remedy in line with European standards. Whether these steps are to be undertaken simultaneously or sequentially, and in what order, is a matter requiring careful assessment and decision-making. As Confucius observed, “even the longest journey begins with a single step”; beyond discussions and debates, we have yet to take that first step and remain at the very beginning of the path towards introducing a constitutional complaint. The question that arises is: what should be done in the meantime? We are discussing the scope of rights and which rights should fall under constitutional judicial review. There are differing views, which will become relevant once we begin to decide what exactly should be protected through a constitutional complaint. Until then, it should be borne in mind that three elements are essential for its introduction: the legal framework, legal culture, and the institutional capacities of the Constitutional Court.
With regard to constitutional culture, this includes the manner in which Article 110, paragraph 3 is interpreted, particularly in relation to the three civil and political rights it encompasses. There is a missed opportunity, through the development of legal culture, to interpret the prohibition of discrimination more broadly and thereby encompass a wider range of rights. Secondly, in the area of political action and association, there is also scope—through the development of constitutional legal culture—to include a broader spectrum of political rights. Whether this approach will be pursued prior to the formal introduction of a broader framework depends on the level of judicial activism and the approach adopted by constitutional courts in this area.
I often feel the need to introduce a time frame, drawing on comparative examples. Turkey, for instance, was mentioned—we had the opportunity to visit there. In the absence of such a mechanism, a formal transitional period was established from 2010 to 2012 to implement all necessary measures and prepare the legal system for the introduction of a constitutional complaint. The state itself highlights this as a successful example. By contrast, Croatia introduced the constitutional complaint in 2001 through amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Court, with immediate effect and without a transitional period. Our system is closer to the Croatian example than to that of Turkey, given that, like Croatia, we operate within a European continental legal system. We already possess a certain level of preparedness, including mechanisms for the protection of rights that exhibit many characteristics of a constitutional complaint, as well as legal advisers and judges who are familiar with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. By opening debates of this kind, and with the support of the international community, we can prepare relatively quickly to introduce a constitutional complaint as soon as the necessary legal and normative preconditions are established. Until then, it remains for us to interpret Article 110, paragraph 3 in a manner that allows for the inclusion of rights beyond the strict and restrictive formalism currently present in defining the scope of constitutionally protected rights.