At the Constitutional Court, on 24 March 2026, a roundtable was held on the topic “Introduction of a Constitutional Complaint?”, organised with the support of the Delegation of the European Union in Skopje. The event also featured an address by Judge Dobrila Kacarska, who emphasised:
I will not elaborate extensively on the issue of introducing a constitutional complaint, as during my three-year term as President I have, more than anyone before me, consistently advocated for its introduction through numerous public appearances and initiatives. In those meetings with the competent authorities, I called for a partial opening of the Constitution, specifically to address this issue alone, without extending the discussion to other matters. However, I did not encounter sufficient understanding – this is well known to those present here and to the public at large. I was even, in a certain sense, criticised, as though this were merely a personal preference, despite our shared awareness of its significance and the benefits it would bring to all citizens.
I would further add that the Republic of North Macedonia, like the other former Yugoslav republics, emerged from a common political system and, upon gaining independence, faced similar challenges: the establishment of independent institutions and the consistent application of the principle of separation of powers. Nevertheless, the responses to these challenges were not identical, particularly in relation to ensuring effective protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this regard, an analysis of regional experiences indicates that North Macedonia has remained an exception, particularly with respect to the introduction of the constitutional complaint.
For thirty years, the legal system has operated with an omission that is not merely a technical issue, but a substantive weakness in the protection of constitutional rights. This is also confirmed by the archives of the Constitutional Court, which record hundreds of applications that have not received judicial resolution, solely because the Court’s jurisdiction is limited and does not allow for adjudication of all violations of human rights and freedoms, but only within the narrowly defined framework of Article 110, paragraph 3 of the Constitution.