Organization

a) The Constitutional Court consists of nine judges. The Constitutional Court elects a President from its own ranks for a term of three years without the right to reelection. The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia elects the judges of the Constitutional Court from the rank of outstanding members of the legal profession for a term of nine years without the right to reelection. a) The Constitutional Court consists of nine judges. The Constitutional Court elects a President from its own ranks for a term of three years without the right to reelection. The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia elects the judges of the Constitutional Court from the rank of outstanding members of the legal profession for a term of nine years without the right to reelection. 

The office of the judge to the Constitutional Court is incompatible with the performance of other public office, profession or membership in a political party. Judges of the Constitutional Court are granted immunity in the same manner with the representatives in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. The Court decides on the immunity of the judges by a procedure defined in the Court’s Rules of Procedure. The judges of the Constitutional Court cannot be called up for duties in the Armed Forces. Providing independence of the constitutional judiciary is the basic request considered while deciding on questions about the composition and election of judges in the Constitutional court, which is a necessary addition to the principle for independence of the constitutional judiciary from the organization of power. However, the organs of political decision-making, can have the strongest influence, apart from the field of financing, on the composition, by election of Constitutional judges, and thus on the constitutional/judicial function. It is undoubtedly so that through the composition, i.e. election of judges in the Constitutional court, the legislature can indirectly influence the role of this constitutional organ. The Constitution limits the possibility for this kind of influence to a large extent, bearing in mind that the mandate of the judges is nine years and does not coincide with the mandate of the representative organ, that the office of Constitutional Court judge is incompatible with membership in a political party, that, under terms stated in the Constitution, the Constitutional Court decides independently when a judge’s term of office ceases, and especially that, according to the Constitution, the President of the Republic nominates two judges, the State Judiciary Council nominates two, and the constitutional commitment in Amendment XV of the Constitution is that the Assembly elects three judges with a majority vote from the total number of representatives within which there must be majority of the total number of votes of representatives of the communities which are not in majority in the Republic of Macedonia.  

An addition necessary to the foundations of the Constitutional Court’s autonomy, which arise from its position in the constitutional system and the manner judges are elected, is providing financial independence of the Court from other organs of the state authorities which determine and execute the budget. Moreover, financial matters pertaining to the Constitutional Court have negative influence on its role as a whole. Namely, the independent and autonomous position of the Court determined by the Constitution would be more complete and realistic provided it had greater financial independence. At present, the assets of the Constitutional Court are provided by the Budget of the Republic of Macedonia without any greater influence by the Court.

b) The Constitutional Court settles matters within its competence on full bench. The decisions are reached by a majority of votes.
Prior to reaching decisions on regular sessions, the Court may hold preparatory sessions and consultations. The Court organizes public hearings when it recognizes the need, except in cases when it decides on a request for protection of individual rights when the decision is, by rule, made on bases of a public hearing. 

The Court founds permanent and ad hoc commissions for organizational issues and issues in the line of work. 

The activities of the Court are carried out through special service.